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large effects ofA long standingissue inmacroeconomic, Ii that of the relation of Imperfect
competition to fluctuation! in output. In this paper we examine the relation between
monopolisticcompetition and the role of aggregate demand in the determination of
output. We first show that monopolistically competitive economies exhibitan
aggregatedemand externality. We then show that1 because of thisexternality, small
menu costs, that is small cost of changing prices may lead to large effects of
aggregate demand on output and on welfare.
The paper is organized asfollows.Section I builds a simple general equilibrium
model, with monopolistic competition in both labor and goods markets, and with
nominal moneyit then characterizes the equilibrium. Section II characterizes the
inefficiency associated with monopolistic competition and shows the inefficiency to
be due to an aggregate demand externality. Bection III studies the effect, ofchange!
in nominal money, when money is the numeraire, and when thereare small, second
order, costs of changing prices. It shows that changes in nominalmoney may have
first order effects on output and welfare, and shows the close relation betweenthis
result and the results obtained in Section II.
Section I. A model of monopolistic competition
We want to construct a modelinwhich each price setter is large in its own
market but small with respect to the economy. The most convenient assumption is that
of monopolistic competition. The simplest model of monopolistic competition, forour2
purposes, would be one of households using labor to produce differentiated goods.
However, because we want to focus later on both wage and price decisions, and want
the model to be easily comparable to the standard macroeconomic model, we construct a
model with both households and firms, and with separate labor and goods markets. Both
labor and goods markets are monopolistically competitive. Each firm sells a product
which is an imperfect substitute for other productseach household sells a type of
labor which is an imperfect substitute for other types. The assumption of
monopolistic competition in both sets of markets is made for symmetry and
transparence rather than for realism. Although we choose to interpret suppliers of
labor as individual households, an alternative interpretation is to think of themas
unions or syndicates (as in Hart C 1982)).
The second choice follows from the need to avoid Says law, or the result that
the supply of goods produced by the monopolistically competitive firmsautomatically
generates its own demand. To avoid this, we must allow agents to have the choice
between consumption of these goods and something else. In the standard macroeconomic
model, the choice is between consumption and savings. In other models of monopolistic
competition, the choice is between produced goods and a non produced good (Hart, 1982
for example), or between produced goods and leisure (Startz 1985). Here, we shall
assume that the choice ts between buying goods and holding money. This is most simply
and most crudely achieved by having real money balances in the utility function of
agents. Thus, money plays the role of the non produced good and provides services'2.
A Glower constraint would lead to similar results. Developing an
explicitly intertemporal model just to justify why money is positively valued
does not seem worth the additional complexity here.
There are however differences between money and a non produced good,
which arise from the fact that real, not nominal money balances enter utility
we shall point out differences as we ao along.3
Money is also the numeraire, so that firms andworkers quote prices and wages in
terms of •cney p this will playessentially no role in this and the newt section, but
will become important in Section ill
The third choice is to sake assumptions aboututility and technology which lead
to demand antpricing relations which areas close to traditional ones as possible,
so as to allow an easy co.parison with standard macroeconomicmodels. This however
sometimes requires strong restrictions on utility andtechnology, which we shall
indicate as we go along
The model3
The economy is composed of m firms, eachproducing a specific good which is an
imperfect substitute for the other goods, and n consumer—workers, households for
short, each of them owning a type of labor which is an imperfectsubstitute 4cr the
other types. As a result, each firm has somemonopoly power when it sets its price,
and each worker has some monopoly power when he sets hiswage4. We now describe the
problem faced by each firm and each household.
Firms are indexed by i, i 1,... ,m. Each firm i has the following technology
n-1 I
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The model can be viewed as an extension of theDixit—Stiglitz (1977)
model of monopolistic competition to macroeconomics.
Since in equilibrium each labor supplier sellssome of his labor to all
firms, it is again more appropriate to think of labor suppliers as craft
unions rather than individual workers. However sincewe want to analyze labor
supply and consumption decisions simultaneously, we shall continue to refer to
labor suppliers as "consumer—workers' or households.4
Vsdenotesthe output of firm I. Ni., denotes the quantity of labor of type i
used in the production of output i. There are n different types of labor, indexed i,
1,... ,n. The production function isaCES production function, with all inputs
entering symmetrically3.
The two parameters characterising the technology are sando. The parameter u Is
equal to the elasticity of substitution of inputs in production ; it will also be the
elasticity of demand 4cr each type of labor with respect to the relative wage. The
parameter is equal to the inverse of the degree of returns to scale—1 will be
the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output —elasticity of marginal cost
for short in what follows—. To guarantee the existence of an equilibrium, we limit
ourselves to the case whereis strictly greater than unity and where misequal to
or greater than unity.
Each period, the firm maxinises profits. Nominal profits for firm i are given by
n
(2) V =PV—EW N±
P1 denotes the nominal output price of firm i. It, denotes the nominal wage
associated with labor type j. The firm maximises (2) subject to the production
function (1) •Ittakes as given nominal wages and the prices of the other outputs. It
also faces a downward sloping demand schedule for its product, which will be derived
below as a result of utility maximisation by households. We assume that the number of
firms is large enough that taking other prices as given is equivalent to taking the
price level as given.
We take the number of firms as given. The issue of whether there are
fixed costs of production tan therefore be left aside.5
Householdsare indewed by j, j al,... ,n.Houi,holdj supplies labor of type j.
It derives utility from leisure, consumption and realmoney balances. Its utility
function is given by i
1—1 p
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The first term, Cj,isa consumption index —basket— which gives the effect of
the consumption of goods on utility, C±. denotes theconsumption of good i by
household j. C., is a CES function of the Cs.All types of consumption goods enter
utility symmetrically. The parameter 6 is the elasticity of substitution between
consumption goods in utilityit will also be the elasticity of demand for each type
of good with respect to its relative price. To guarantee existence ofan equilibrium,
6 is restricted to be greater than unity.
The second term gives the effect of real money balances onutility, is a
parameter between zero and one. Nominal money balances are deflated by the nominal
price index associated with C. We shall refer to P as the price level;
The third term in utility gives the disutility from work. N is the amount of
labor supplied by household j.—1is the elasticity of marginal disutility of labor
p is assumed to be equal to or greater than unity67.
The assumption that utility is homogeneous of degree one in consumption
and real money balances, as well as additively separable in consumption and
'eal money balances or the one hand and leisure on the other is made to
eliminate income effects on labor supply. Under these assumptions1 competitive
labor supply would just be a function of the real wage1 using the price index
lefined in the text. Italsoimplies that utility is linear in incomethis
-acilitates welfare evaluations.
For reasons which will beclearbelow,weshall exclude the case wherea
Households maximise utility subject to a budget constraint. Each household takes
prices and other wages as given. Again we assume that n is large enough that taking
other wages as given is equivalent to taking the nominalwage level as given. It also
faces a downward demand schedule for its type of labor, which will be derivedas the
result of profit maximisation by firms. The budget constraint is given by I
S m
(4) E P. C. + w3w +p,+
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Mdenotes the initial endowment of money. Vj is the share of profits of firm i
going to household j.
u I Ii b r i urn
The derivation of the equilibrium is given in the appendix. The equilibrium can
be characterised by a relation between real money balances and aggregate demand, a
arofdemand functions for goods and labor and by a pair of price aridwage rules
The relation between real money balances and real aggregate consumption
expenditures, which we shall call aggregate demand for short, is given by
(5) V =K(HIP) where
n m m i—e 1
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The demand functions for goods and labor are given by i





where the wage index W I, given by ;
n1—0 1
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The price aridwagerules are given by i
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The letters K, K, K, K, K. are constants which depend on theparameters of the
technology and the utility function as well as the number of firms and households.
We interpret these equations, starting with the relation between realmoney
balances and aggregate demand. First order conditions for householdsimply a linear
relation between desired real money balances and consumption expenditures.
Aggregating over households and using the fact that, in equilibrium, desired money
equal actual money gives equation (5).
The demand for each type of good relative to aggregate demand is a function of
the ratio of its nomtnal price to the nominal price index, the price level, with
elasticity (—9). The demand for labor by firms is a derived demand for laborit
depends on the demand for goods and thus on real money balances. The demand for each
type of labor is a function of the ratio of its nominal wage to the nominalwage
index, with elasticity (—u).B
We now consider the price rule. Given the price level, each firm isa monopolist
with non increasing returns to scale and decides about its real—or relative— price
Ps/P. An increase in the real wage (W/P) shifts the marginal costcurve upward,
leading to an increase in the relative price. An increase in realmoney balances
shifts the demand curve for each product upward
;if the firm operates under strictly
decreasing returns, the marginal cost curve is upward sloping and the relative price
increases. If the firm operates under constant returns, the shift inaggregate demand
has no effect on Its relative price.
We finally consider the ge rule. We can think of householdsas solving their
utility maximisation problem in two steps. They first solve for the allocation of
their wealth, including labor income, between consumption of the differentproducts
and real money balances. After this step, the assumption thatutility is linearly
homogenous in consumption and real money balances implies that utility is linear in
wealth, thus linear in labor income. The next step is to solve for the level of labor
supply and the nominal wage. Given that utility is linear in labor income, we can
think of households as monopolists maximising the surplus fromsupplying labor.
Formally, if p denotes the constant marginal utility of real wealth, households solve
in the second step
maxp(W3/P) N — ;N =K(P1/P)(W4/W)
The real wage relevant for worker i is W,/P, which we can write as the product
(W/W) (WIRY. The demand for labor of type j is a function of the relativewage (W,/W)
as well as real money balances (rIIP)9
An increase in theaggregate real wage ((dIP) leads household j toincreaseits
laborsupply, thus to decrease its relativewage (WItfl. An increase in real money
balances leads, if p is strictly greater thanunity, to an increase in the relative
wage. If p is equal to unity, if themarginal disutility oflabor isconstant,
workerssupply more labor at the same relativewage, in response to anincrease In
aggregate demand.
Y!!!Letriceouillbrium
Equilibrium and symmetry, both across firms andacross households, implies that
all relative prices and all relativewages must be equal to unity, Thus, using P. F'
for all i and W, =Wfor all J, and substituting in equations (10)and (11) gives
'—1
(12) (P/W) (one—i)) K (HIP)
(13) (k/F') =(o'/(u—l))K...(HIP)
Equation(12), which is obtained from the individual price rules and the
requirement that all prices be the same gives the pricewage ratio (P/W) as a
function of real money balances. If firmsoperate under strictly decreasing returns,
the price wage ratio is an increasing function of thelevel of output, thus of real
money balances. Equivalently, the real wage (W/P) consistent with firms behavioris
adecreasing function of real money balances. We shall refer toequation (12) as the
"aggregate price rule".
Equation (13), which is obtained from the individualwage rules and the






realmoney balances. 14 p iistrictlygreater than unity, that is if workers have
increasing marginal disutility of work, an increase in realmoney balances, which
leads to in increase in the derived demand forlabor, requires an increase in the
real wage. The real wage consistent with households' behavioris an increasing
function of real money balances. We shall refer toequation (13) as the "aggregate
wage rule.
Equilibrium values of (W/P) and (M/P) are obtained fromequations (12) and (13).
The equilibrium value of output follows from (5). Theequilibrium is characterised
graphically in Figure 1. As (12) and (13) are log linear1 wemeasure logcw/P) on the
vertical axis and log(M/P) (or logY as the twoare linearly related) on the
horizontal axis. If a and p are both strictlygreater than unity, the aggregate wage
rule is upward sloping while the aggregate price rule isdownward sloping. The
equilibrium determines the real wage and realmoney balances. Given nominal money, it
determines the price level. Given real money balances,we obtain the equilibrium
level of aggregate demand and output.
Figure 1 looks very much like the characterization of equilibrium underperfect
competition, with an upward labor supply curve and a dDwnward sloping labor demand.
What is therefore the effect of monopolistic competition 7 This isthe issue to which
we now turn.Section 2 Inefficiency and externalities
Comparing monopolistic competition and perfect competition
lo characterize the inefficiency associated with monopolistic competition, we
first compare the equilibrium to the competitive equilibrium. The competitive
equilibrium is derived under the same assumptions about tastes, technology and the
number of firms and households, but assuming that each firm (each household) takes
its price (wage) as given when deciding about its output (labor).
The competitive equilibrium is very similar to the monopolisticallycompetitive
one. The demand functions for goods and labor are still given by equations (7) and
(8). The price and wage rules are identical to equations (10) and (11), except for
the absence of 8/Ce—i) in the price rules and the absence of c/(u—i) in thewage
rules (the constant terms K, K,,, K,, K... and K are the same in both equilibria). (The
derivation is left to the reader). The explanation is simple. The term 61(9—1) is the
excess of price over marginal cost, reflecting the degree of monopoly power of firms
in the goods marketif firms act competitively, price is instead equal to
cost. The same explanation applies to households.
Again, symmetry requires in equilibrium all nominal prices and all nominal wages
to be the saristhis gives equations identical to (12) and (13), but without the
terms S/Cs—)) in the aggregate price rule and /(o'—i) in the aggregatewage rule. The
price wage ratio consistent with firms' behavior is lower in the competitive case by
9/CS—i) at any level of real money balances (output); the real wage consistent with
household's behavior is lower in the competitive case by u/Co—1) atany level of real









money balances. The monopolistically competitive and competitive aggregate wage and
price rules are drawn in Figure 2. Point A gives the competitive equilibrium, point
A gives the monopolistically competitive equilibrium.
The equilibrium level of real money balances is lower in the monopolistic
equilibriumthe price level is higher. Employment and output are lower. What
happens to the real wage is ambiguous and depends on the degrees of monopoly power in
the goods and the labor markets. If, for example, there is monopolistic competition
in the goods market but perfect competition in the labor market, then the real wage
is unambiguously lower under monopolistic competition.
Denoting by R the ratio of output in the monopolistically competitive
equilibrium to output in the competitive equilibrium, R is given by
Ro'—1 9-1 ) a-l 1
e 8
P is an increasing function of and 8. The higher the elasticity of
substitution between goods or between types of labor, the closer is the economy to
the competitive equilibrium. P is an increasing function ofand .Ifand p are
both close to unity, P is small the existence of monopoly power in either the goods
or the labor markets can have a large effect on equilibrium output.
Aggregate demand externalities
Under monopolistic competition, output of monopolistically produced goods is too
low. We have shown above that this follows from the existence of monopoly power in
price and wage setting. n alternative way of thinking about it is that it follows
from an aggregate demand externality.13
The argument is as follows iinthe monopolistically competitive equilibrium,
each price (wage) setter has, given other prices, no incentive to decrease itsown
price (wage) and increase its output (labor). Suppose however that all price setters
decrease their prices simultaneously p this increases realmoney balances and
aggregate demand. The increase in output reduces the initial distortion of
underproduction and underemployment and increases social welfare6.
We now make the argument more precise1 By the definition of amonopolistically
competitive equilibrium, no firm has an incentive to decrease its price, and no
worker has an incentive to decrease its wage, given other prices andwages, Consider
now a proportional decrease in all wages arid all prices, (dP./P1 ) (dW,/W) < 0for
all i and i, which leaves all relative prices unchanged but decreases theprice
level.
Consider first the change in the real value of firms9. At a given level of
output and employment, the real value of each firm is unchanged. The decrease in the
price level however increases real money balances and aggregate demand. This in turn
shifts outward the demand curve faced by each firm and increases profitan increase
in demand at a given relative price increases profit as price exceedsmarginal cost.
Thus, the real value of each firm increases.
° Analternative way of stating the argument is as follows14 starting
from the monopolistically competitive equilibrium, a firm decreased its price,
this would lead to a small decrease in the price level and thus to a small
increase in aggregate demand. While the other firms and households would
benefit from this increase in aggregate demand, the original firm cannot
capture these benefits and thus has no incentive to decrease its price. We
have chosen to present the argument in the text to facilitatecomparison with
the argument of Section III.
What happens to the real value of firms is obviously of no direct
relevance for welfare. This step is however required to characterize what
happens to the utility of household below.14
Consider then the effect of a proportional reduction of prices andwages on the
utility of each household. Consider household j. We have seen that, once the
household has chosen the allocation of his wealth between real money balances and
consumption, we can write its utility as:
p(l1/P) —
wherep is the constant marginal utility of real wealth and I. is the total wealth of
the Jthhousehold.Using the budget constraint, we can express utility as
p a
IL, [j(W,/P)N—N3p E V±3/P +p(M3/P)
i•1
Utility is the sum of three terms. The second is profit income —in terms of
utility—we have seen that each firms profit goes up after an increase in
aggregate demand. Thus, this term increases. The first term is the household
surplus from supplying labor. At a given level of employment, N, the proportional
change in wages and prices leaves this term unchanged. But the increase In aggregate
demand and the implied derived increase in employment implies that this term
increases : at a given real wage, an outward shift in the demand for labor increases
utility as the real wage initially exceeds the marginal utility of leisure. The third
term is the real value of the money stack, which increases with the fall in the price
level. Tnus, utility unambiguously increases.
10 Note that, if we were performing the same experiment in the neighborood
not of the monopolistically competitive but of the competitive equilibrium,
the first two terms would be equal to zero. The third one would however still
oe present. This is one of the implications of our use of real money as the
non produced good. If real money enters utility, then the competitive
equilibrium isnota Pareto optimum, as a small decrease in the price level
increases welfare. This inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium disappears
f money is replaced by a non produced good, while the aggregate deamand
externality under monopolistic competition remains valid (see Kiyotaki 1994).A similar point is made by Cooper and John C 1985].
As we have not specified how money is introduced ir. thiseconomy, it is
cest to think of them as helicopter drops.
13 Here,and in the next section, instead of focusing on the effects of
aggregate aemand on output in general, we focus for convenience on themore
iarrow question of whether changes in nominal money have real effects. The
esults here and in the next section would applyequally to non monetary pure
ggreqate demand shifts, i.e. shifts which leave labor supplyunchanged at a
uven real wage, where the real wage is defined as theaoe in terms of the
:onsumption basket. If we modify the utility function to be
The notion of an aggregate demandexternality is an old idea in macroeconomics.
It has been formalised in various recent
papers; although these papers have on the
surface relatively little incommon, they share the following properties u an
increase in one agents activity increases theactivity level and welfare of others
a general increase in activity, if it can beengineered, by taxation or other means,
may be welfare improving". Diamond (1982) builds a macroeconomicmodel where trade
takes placethroughsearch and shows that increased search byone trader has
externalities as it increases the probability for othertraders to find a profitable
trade. Startz (1984) builds a macroeconomic model inwhich firms can not directly
observe effort by individual workers. This leads toa payment scheme which has the
implication that the optimal amount effort for each workerdepends on the level of
effort put in by other workers. In bothcases, a small increase in activity is
welfare improving.
Identifying the inefficiency associated with monopolisticcompetition as an
aggregate demand externality does not however imply that movementsin aggregate
demand affect output. Consider for examplechanges in nominal money'2. As equations
(12) and (13) are homogeneous of degree zero inP, W and H, nominal money is
obviously neutral, affecting all nominal prices andwages proportionately and leaving
output and employment Thus something else is needed to obtain real16





Then shifts in e will shift the demand for goods given real money balances,
while leaving labor supply unchanged at a given real wage and are therefore
pure aggregate demand shocks. By contrast, shifts inare not pure aggregate
deamnd shocks.17
Section 3. Menu costs and real effects ofnominal tone
We now introduce small costs ofsetting prices, small "menu" costs. There are
obviously costs to changing prices, whichrange from the cost of changing tags and
printing new catalogs to gathering the information neededto choose the new prices,
informing new customers of these prices and so on. Thequestion however is whether
these costs, which cannot bevery large, can have important macroeconomic effects,
This section shows that theymay. Small menu costs may imply large movements in
activity in response to demand, and may have large welfareeffects".
The first part of the section formalizes theargument for small changes in
nominal money, and shows the close relation betweenthe aggregate demand externality
argument of the previous section and the argument presented inthis section. The
second part considers larger changes in nominalmoney, and focuses on the effects of
structural parameters on the ratio of output andwelfare effects to menu costs.
We are not the first to make this point. Ilankiw(1985) has pointed out
that, under imperfect competition! private and social costs ofprice setting could differ
substantially, leaving open the possibility of large welfare effectsof demand changes.
Akerlof and Yellen (l9BSa, 1985b) have emphasized thepotential welfare effects of near
rationality under imperfect competition. Decision makersare said to be "near rational" if
they react to changes in the environment only if notreacting would entail a first order
ioss. As Akerlof and Yellen point out however, nearrationality can be described as full
rationality subject to second order costs of takingdecisions, so that their analysis is
directly relevant to this section. Our contribution is topoint out the relation to the
aggregate demand externality emphasized in the last section, andbecause our model is more
explicitly based on utility and profit maximisation, togive a more detailed welfare
analysi S.18
The effects of small changes in nominal money
We start by considering the effects of a small change in nominal money1 dM,
starting from the equilibrium described in the first section. The argument proceeds
as follows
At the initial nominal prices arid wages, the change in nominal money leads to a
change in aggrei'te demand, thus to a change in the demand facing each firm. If
demand is satisfied, the change in output implies in turn a change In the derived
demand for labor, thus a change in the demand facing each worker. Unless firms
operate under constant returns, each firm wants to change its relative price. Unless
workers have constant marginal utility of leisure, each worker wants to change his
relative wage. We show however that the loss in value to a firm which does not adjust
its relative price is of second order ; the same is true of the utility of a worker
who does not adjust his relative wage. Thus second order menu costsmay prevent firms
and workers from adjusting prices and wages. The implication is that nominal prices
and nominal wages do not adjust to the change in nominal money. The second part of
the argument is to show that the change in real money balances has first order
effects on weifarewe show that the effect on welfare is indeed first order, and of
the same sign as the change in money. The argument has very much the same structure
as the aggregate demand externality argument of the previous section ; this
coincidence is not accidental and we return to it below.
The first part is a direct application of the envelope theorem. Consider firms
first. Let V1 be the value of firm i. V± is a function of P± as well as of P, W and II
V1 =V1(Pi ,P,W,tl) .LetV1 —bethe maximised value of firm i, after maximisation
over P1V =V(P,W,M)












To a first order, the effect of a change in Fl on the value of the firm is the
same whether or not it adjusts its price optimally in response to the change in P1.
Exactly the same argument applies to the utility of the household. Thus, second order
menu costs (but larger than the second order loss in utility or in value) will
prevent each firm from changing its price given other prices and wages and each
worker from changing its wage given other prices and wages. The implication is that
all nominal prices and wages remain unchanged and that the increase in nominalmoney
implies a proportional increase in real money balances.
What remains to be shown is that the change in real money balances has positive
first order effects on welfare. }owever, aswehave already shown in the previous
section, the increase in real money balances, associated with the increase in
aggregate demand and employment, raise; firmsprofits and the households' surpluses
from supplying labor. Thus, it increases welfare in the neighborood of the
monopol i stically competitive equilibrium.
The relation between aggregate demand externalities and the argument of this
section is illustrated using the diagram in Figure 315•
Figure 3 plots the price rule (10) giving the price chosen by firm i as a
function of the price level. The logarithm of the price level is on the vertical axis
while the logarithm of the price of the it' firm is on the horizontal oneboth are
The reason why the argument below is only an illustration is that it only looks at
firms, taking the real wage as givenit is thus only a partial equilibrium argument. The
rgument would be a general equilibrium one if we were looking at an economy composed of
ouseholds, each producing a differentiated good.20
measured asratiosto nominal money. The price rule is drawnfor a given real wage
(WIN (assumed to be set atitsmonopolistically competitive value) and gives
log(P/K) asa linearfunctionof logCP/P'l). in the presence ofmonopoly power, the
price rule has slope greater than one. We also draw
isoprofit loci, giving
combinations of (P,/M) and (PIM) whichyield the samelevelof real profit for the
firm''. The symmetric monopolistically
competitive equllibriu& is given by the
intersection of the price rule and the 45degreeline,point E. Point A gives the
highest real profit point on the 45 degree line.
The aggregate demand externalityargument can then be stated asfollows.
Consider a small proportional decrease ofprices, keeping nominal money and the real
wage constant. The equilibrium moves from paint E toa point like E along the 45
degree line. The profit of each firm rises withthe increase in aggregate demand.
However, in the absence of coordination, no firm hasan incentive to reduce prices
away from the equilibrium point E.
The menu cost argument considers insteada small increase in nominal monet. At
the initial set of prices, realmoney balances would increase and the economy would
move from point E to a point like point E.But,absent menu costs, each firm would
find in its interest to increase itsprice until the economy had returned to point E.
In the presence of menu costs however, thesemenu costs, if large enough, can prevent
this movement back to E, so that theeconomy remains at E and all firms end up with
higher real profits.
The figure assumes decreasing returns to scale.Note also that, as firms take the
Price level as given when choosing their ownprice, isoprofit loci are horizontal along
the price rule.21
P similar argument, although slightly more complicated, holds for wages. We
shall not present it here.
it is also important to note the specific role pyd by mony in this section.
The presence of an aggregate demand externality does not depend on the nature of the
produced good, and on the nature of the numeraire. The results of this section depend
on money being the non produced good and the numeraire, That money is the numeraire
implies that, given menu costs, unchanged prices and wages mean unchanged nominal
prices and wages. That money is the non produced good implies that as the government
can vary the amount of nominal money, it can, if nominal prices and wages do not
adjust, change the amount of real money balances, the real quantity of the non
produced good.
The effects of iaroer chanoes in nominal money
If we want to examine the effects of larger changes in nominal money, we can no
longer use the result derived above, for its proof relies on the assumption of small
changes in money. For larger changes, the private opportunity costs of not adjusting
prices in response to the change in money —private costs, for short— are no longer
negligible and depend on the parameters of the model. We now investigate this
dependence.
The private costs laced by a firm depends on the size of the demand shifts as
well as on the two parametersand 9. As we have seen, these costs are of second
order in response to a change in aggregate demand, thus roughly proportional to the
square of the change in aggregate demand. More precisely, define NA p ,$) to be the
private opportunity cost to a firm expressed as a proportion of initial revenues,
associated with not adjusting its price in response to a change of IOOA% in aggregate22
demand, when all other firms and households keep their prices andwages unchanged.
Then, by simple computation, we get
L (A m,9) (C ( —1)2(9I)]/ 12(1+9(—1))])A' +o(A2)
where o(A2) is of third order.
The closer -is to one ,i•ethe closer to constant returns are the returns to
scale, the smaller the private cost. In the limit, ifis equal to one, then private
costs of not adjusting prices are equal to zero as the optimalresponse of a
monopolist to a multiplicative shift in isoelastic demand under constantmarginal
cost is to leave the price unchanged. Thus private costsare an increasing function
of .Theyare also an increasing function of 9the higher the elasticity of demand
with respect to price, the higher the private costs of notadjusting prices.
Ewactly the same analysis applies to workers. The two important parameters for
them are and o, If we define the function L in the sameway as above, the private
opportunity cost to a worker, measured in terms of consumption and expressed asa
proportion of initial consumption), associatet with not adjusting thewaqe in
response to a change of lOOM, in aggregate demand, when all other firms and
households keep their prices and wages unchanged, is givenby
C (9—1)J9] L( (1+A) —1
where (9—1)I9isthe initial share of wage income in BNP.
If is close to unity, i.e if the elasticity of the marginal disutility of
labor is close to unity, private costs of not adjustingwages are small ; in the
limit, if marginal disutility of labor is constant, private costs are equal to zero.
If is very large, if labor types are close substitutes, private costs of not
adjusting wages are high.23
Table Ia gives the size of menu colts as a proportion of the firms revenues
(GNP produced by the firm) which are just sufficient to prevent a firm from adjusting
its price in response to a change in demandTable lb gives the size of menu costs
(in terms of consumption) as a proportion of initial consumption (GNP consumed by the
worker) which are just sufficient to prevent a worker from adjusting hiswage. --
LbieI Changes in agQgate demand and menu costs
(a) (b)
Loss in value to a firm from not Loss in utility (in terms of consumptiDn)
adjusting prices (as a proportion to a worker from not adjusting wages as
of initial revenues) a proportion of initial consumption)*
alpha theta 1.05 1.10 beta sigma 1.05 1.10
1.1 5 .003% .013 1.4 5 .0667. .265
1.1 2 .001 .004 1.4 2 .027 .111
20 .008 .031 20 .105 .416
1.0 5 .000 .000 1.2 5 .025 .100
1.3 5 .018 .071 1.6 5 .112 .451
* e 5 a1.1
N0 is the initial level of nominal money, H, the level after the change.
Thus, given the unit elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to real money
balances and the assumption that all other prices have not changed, table Ia gives
the private costs associated with not changing prices in the face of 57. and lox
changes in demand to the firm. The main conclusion is that very small menu costs ,say
less than .017. of revenues, may be sufficient to prevent adjustment of prices.
Results are qualitatively similar for workers. Table lb gives the private costs of
not changinc the effects of changes of +57. and +107. in the demand for final goods. It24
assumes that is equal to 1.1, sothatchanges in the der2ved demand for labor are
of 5.5% and 11% approximately. Weexpect p to be higher thanso that table lb looks
at values of p between 1.2 and 1.6. Forvalues of p close to unity, requiredmenu
costs are again very smallas p increases however, required menu casts becomenon
negligible for and a 11% change in demand, they reach.45% of initial
consumption, a number which is no longernegligible.
The more relevant comparison however, atleast from the point of view of
welfare, is between private costs and welfareeffects, i.e. the change in utility
resulting from the changes in output, employment andreal money which are implied by
a change in nominal money at given prices andwages. Welfare effects depend on the
size of the change in nominalmoney aswellasonthe parameters a11 ando
pthe
dependence is a complex one and we shall notanalyze it here in detail, Table 2 gives
numerical examples. It gives the requiredmenu costs and welfare effects associated
with two different changes in nominalmoney, 5% and 10% and different values of the
structural parameters.
For each of the two changes inmoney, the first column gives the minimum value
of menu costs, expressed as aproportion of GNP, which prevents adjustment of nominal
prices and wages ; this value is the sum ofmenu costs required to prevent firms from
adjusting their prices and workers from adjusting theirwages, given other wages and
prices. The second column gives the welfare effects ofan increase in nominal money
at unchanged prices and wages, expressed in termsof consumption, again as a
proportion of GNP. The third gives the ratio of welfareeffects to menu costs.25
Table 2 Menu costs and welfare effects
1.05 M1/N0 =1.10
alpha beta Menu Welfare RatioMenu Welfare Ratio
Costs Effects Costs effects
(eu5)
1.1 1.2 .03% 1.797. 60 .11% 3.54%32
1.4 .07% 1.83% 26 .28% 3.60% 13
1.6 .11% 1.91% 17 .46% 3.72% 8
1.2 1.2 .04% 1.62% 45 .15% 3.57% 24
1.4 .08% 1.877. 24 .33% 3.67% Ii
1.6 .13% 1.98% 15 .53% 3.65% 7
($.o.10)
1.1 1.2 .03% .94% 31 .11% 1.86% 17
1.4 .06% 1.02% 17 .23% 1.93% 8
1.6 .09% 1.11% 12 .36% 2.05% 6
1.2 1.2 .04% .99% 25 .16% 1.87% 12
1.4 .07% 1.07% 16 .29% 2.01% 7
1.6 .11% 1.27% 12 .44% 2.24% 5
Welfare effects turn out not to be much affected by the specific values of the
parameters, at least for the range of values we consider in the table. Thus, the
ratio of welfare effects to menu cost has the same qualitative behavior as that of
the ratio of output movements to menu costs. It is largest for values of m,p,$ and
a close to unity, and decreases as these parameters increase. In the table, it varies
from 60 for low values of mp,S andto 5 for high values of these parameters.
Demand determinationofoup
We have until now assumed that increases in real money balances at constant
prices and wages led to increases in output and employment. When we were analyzing
the effects of small changes ir money, this assumption was clearly warranted in the-io (k'/p)
0




initial conopolistically competitive equilibrium, as price exceedE marginal cost,
firms will always be willing to satisfy a small increase in demand at the existing
price. The same is true of workersas the real wage initially exceeds the marginal
disutility of labor, workers will willingly accomodate a small increase in demand for
their type of labor. When we consider larger changes in money, this may no longer be
the case. Even if firms do not adjust their price, they have the option of either
accomodating or rationing demand ; they will resort to the second option if marginal
cost exceeds price. The same analysis applies to workers. From standard monopoly




This raises the question of whether, assuming menu costs to be large enough, an
increase in demand can increase output all the way to its competitive level. The
answer is provided in Figure 4. Figure 4 replicates Figure 2 and draws the aggregate
price and wage rules under competitive and monopolistically competitive conditiDns. A
is the monopolistic competitive equilibrium, A' the competitive one. Along the
monopolistically competitive price rule, price exceeds marginal costthus firms
will satisfy demand, at a aiven price wage ratio, until marginal cost equals price,
that is until they reach the competitive locus, In our case, firms will supply up to
point B. The shaded area F is the set of output—real wage at which firms will ration
rather than supply. By a similar argument, workers will supply up to point B •The
shaded area N is the set of real wage combinations where workers do not satisfy labor
demand. The figure makes it clear that an increase in nominal money will increase
output and employment. It also makes clear that, no matter how large menu costs are,27
it is impossible unless the competitive and
monopolistically competitive real wages
are equal, to attain the competitive equilibriumthrough an increase in nominal
money.
What happens therefore as demand increase;depends on both menu casts and supply
constraints. If menu costs are larae, supply constraintswill come into effect first.
If menu costs are smalla more likely case, prices andwagesadjust before supply
constraints come into effect.
Conclusion
The results of this paper are tantalizingly close tothose of traditional
Keynesian models under monopolistic competition, output is toolow, because of an
aggregate demand externality. This externality, together with smallmenu costs,
implies that movements in demand can affect output and welfare. Inparticular,
increases in nominal money can increase bothoutput and welfare, In fact, while we
believe these results to be important to theunderstanding of macroeconomic
fluctuations, it is also clear that there is still a longway to go for this model to
Justify Keynesian results. Let us mention some of the main issues.
The scope for small menu costs to lead tolarge output, employment and welfare
effects in our model depends critically on the elasticity of laborsupply with
respect to the real wage being large enough (on (—l) being small). Evidenceor
individual labor supply suggests however a small elasticity, Thusthe 'menu cost"
approach runs into the same problem as the imperfect informationapproach to output
fluctuationsneither can easily generate large fluctuations inoutput in response
to demand if the real wage elasticity of laborsupply is low. As ir, the imperfect
information case, the theory may be rescued by the distinction betweentemporary and28
permanent changes in demand. An other possibility is that unions have a flatter labor
supply than individuals. More likely, the assumption that labor markets operateas
spot markets (competitive or monopoflstically competitive) may have to be
abandoned''.
The ana'ysis of this paper is purely static. There are substantialconceptual
issues in extending the model to look at the dynamic effects of demandon output, in
the presence of menu costs, If menu costs lead to staggered nominalprice and wage
decisions, with fixed lengths of time between decisions, the model delivers1
depending on the particular staggering structure, the same qualitative resultsas
recent macroeconomic models with staggering, such as those by Akerlof(L969), Taylor
(1979) and Slanchard (1983) (see Blanchard (1985) for a more detailedargument). if
however menu costs lead price and wage setters to use (S,s)policies, which imply
random periods of time between decisions, the resultsmay be quite different p in
response to a change in aggregate demand, only a few prices may be readjustedp they
may however be readjusted by a large amount, implying a large change in the price
level, and little effect of real money on output, apart form the distortions on the
price structure (see Caplin and Spulber (1985), and Blanchard and Fischer (1985) for
further discussion),
'' Thisis the direction taken by Akerlof and Vellen (1985b) who formalize thegoods
market as monopolistically competitive and the labor market using the'efficiency wage"
hypothesis.Appendix
This appendix derives the market equilibrium conditions(5) to (11)
given in the text and proceeds in three steps. The first derives thedemand
functions of each type of )abor and each type ofproduct by solving part of
the maximization problems of firms and households. Thesefunctions hold
whether or not_prices and wages are set by workers andfirms at their profit
or utility maximizing level. The second derives price rules from firms
profit maximization and wage rules from workers utility maximization. The
third characterises market equilibrium.
1. Demands for product and labor types
a) in order to maximize profit, each firm minimizes itsproduction cost
for a given level of output and wages
n n I
sin W N1 subject to ( E NT)
3d j1
Solving this minimimation problem gives i
-a
N1 (n T1 (W3/W) Y
n 1




where W((I/n) W 11—a (a2) 1
The demand for labor of type 3 is therefore given by
—a
= E Nj = (W3/W) N/n (a3)
i =1
mn 1 m
where N ECEE W N±)/W (n 1—o') V1 (a4)
i .1 1=1
N can be interpreted as the aggregate labor index
bI in order to maximize utility, each household chooses the optimum
composition of consumption and money holdings for a giverlevelof total
wealth Ii and product pricess—i or
max A3( t C18 )€+—l(M3/P)
if
subject to E P± C + N3 I.,
1=1
Solving this maximization problem gives i
—8
• (P./P) U Ij/Pm) (a5)
P13 (I—flI and (a6)
A3 i 11/P (a?)
if i—s i I r
where P ((i/rn) E F, ) 1—6 and p •(1m 8—1) (1—1) CaB)
p can be interpreted as the marginal utility of real wealth
The demand for product of type i is therefore given by
—e
Vt =E =(F'1/P) (Vim) (a9)
1=1
n if n
where V =CEE P± C.3)/P (l/P) E I. (alO)
ji jal
V denotes real aggregate consumption expenditures of households and will
be referred to as "aggregate demand",
Note that (a5) ,(a6)(a9) and (alO) imply the following relation
between aggregate demand and aggregate desired real money balances
n
V =(11(1—fl)N/P where Fl =E N'3 (all)
j=l
2. Price and waoe rules
a) Taking as given waaes and the price level1 each firm chooses its
price and output so as to maximize profit
V1 =P.V1 — (43N3 (a12)
j=1
subject to the cost function Cal) and the demand function for its
product (a9). Salving the above maximization problem gives
1 cr1
=(8/48—iHn1—c aV±(4, or equivalently (a13)
1a cr1 1
P1 /P [((8/ (8— 1)) n i—c m ) ((4/F') (V ) 1(1±6 (cr-I) ) (a 14)Equation (all) Implies that the price is equal to 91(6—1) timesthe
b) Taking as given prices and otherwages, each household chooies its
wage and labor supply so as to maximize utility. Using (*6)
u
•p li/P—N
subject to the demand for
constraint i
its type of labor(a3) and the budget
W N +E +
Solvingthis maimization problem givesi
p Wi/P =(u/(o—l))N ,orequivalently
(a 16)
W,/W IC (a/(c—1) ) (/p)n
1—a 6-1 1
)(P/W)(N)J (l+o(—1))
Equation (aiB) implies that the real wage1 In terms ofutility, is equal
to a/Cu—i) times the marginal disutility of labor.
3. Market equilibrium
In equilibrium, desired real money balances must beequal to actual
balances. Thus P1P1'. Replacing in Call) gives
= (rI(1—))P1/P
This is equation (5) in the text. Then, from equations (a4)
,Ca9)and
i =1
If all firms choose the same —not necessarily optimal—price, this
reduces to
Substituting equation
product i, equation (7) in
equation (a3) gives the




equation (10) in the text,











NEn 1— m U/Cl—fl)) (HIP)
(a20)
(a21
(a19) into (a?) gives the demand function for
the text. Substituting equation (a21) into
demand function for labor of type .i, equation (B)
we have not used the price and wage rules to derive
they hold even when prices or wages are not set
(a19) into (a14) gives the price rule for firm i,
Substituting (a19) into (alS) gives the wage rule
in the text.
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